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ADMISSIBILITY AS CAUSE AND EFFECT: CONSIDERING
AFFIRMATIVE RIGHTS UNDER THE CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE
By John G. Douglass*

I. INTRODUCTION

"Confrontation" bespeaks action. We picture two gunslingers
facing off on a dusty Tombstone street. In the setting of a courtroom,
we imagine the punch and counterpunch of a vigorous crossexamination. But when prosecutors offer hearsay in evidence, the law
of confrontation paints a different picture. Courts treat hearsay as a
fixed object for critical examination at trial under the microscopic focus
of two lenses: one crafted by the law of evidence and another, almost
identical, fashioned under the Confrontation Clause. 1 The hearsay is
either reliable or not; it comes in or stays out. Under this approach,
confrontation is not an active process for testing hearsay. It is a passive
screen that separates "good" hearsay from "bad" hearsay. Under this
approach, the Confrontation Clause is not a rule of procedure. It is a
rule of evidence. 2

'Professor of Law, University of Richmond. This essay is a slightly expanded
version of the work in progress that I presented at the Conference on Evidence of the
Association of American Law Schools ("AALS") in Alexandria, Virginia, June 2002. I
wish to express my thanks to Professor Elizabeth Marsh and the AALS Conference
Planning Committee for their kind invitation, and to the Conference participants for
their many thoughtful comments and questions.
l. For a more detailed treatment of the development of the United States Supreme
Court's current approach to confrontation and hearsay, see John G. Douglass, Beyond
Admissibility: Real Confrontation, Virtual Cross-Examination, and the Right to
Confront Hearsay, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 191, 197-206 (1999) [hereinafter Douglass,
Beyond Admissibility].
2. The Court's treatment of the Confrontation Clause as a rule excluding
unreliable hearsay has been the subject of continuous and largely critical commentary
for decades. Among the many excellent critiques is Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the
Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REV. 557 ( 1988). Professor
Jonakait argues that the Court's treatment of the Clause has rendered it a "minor adjunct
of evidence law." Id. at 622.
1047
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But rules of evidence do not exist in a vacuum. Trial lawyers think
strategically. And strategic thinking starts long before trial. Rules for
admitting evidence inside the courtroom affect the parties' strategic
choices outside of court. A rule excluding hearsay from an available
declarant, for example, may lead a litigant to produce that declarant to
provide the same evidence through live testimony at trial. 3 Conversely,
choices before or outside of trial can make the admissibility of evidence
more, or less, fair to an opponent. For example, a party's choice to give
notice and provide discovery regarding a potentially admissible hearsay
statement may allow an opponent a better opportunity to meet that
hearsay with contradictory or impeaching evidence at trial. 4
In this essay, I first examine some of the strategic choices spawned
by the Supreme Court's "microscopic" focus on reliability in
confrontation-hearsay cases. Rather than promoting the value at the
core of the Confrontation Clause-the adversarial testing of prosecution
evidence-the Court's approach leads to choices that ignore that value.
While the Court scrutinizes hearsay under the microscope of reliability,
it leaves the parties free to ignore and even to avoid available
opportunities for effective confrontation of the hearsay declarant. At the
same time, the Court's constitutional definition of reliability-which it
equates with "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions 5-has encouraged
prosecutors to offer, and trial courts to admit, an increasing variety of
less reliable hearsay
I argue for a different approach to hearsay and confrontation: an
approach that promotes different strategic choices. 6 The Confrontation
Clause, I suggest, offers more than the "negative" right to exclude
unreliable hearsay. It encompasses the "affirmative" right to subject
prosecution evidence-including hearsay evidence-to a process of

3. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 804(b). Courts and commentators sometimes refer to
this notion as a rule of "preference" for live testimony. See id., advisory committee's
notes.
4. This is the principle at play in Federal Rule of Evidence 807, which admits
hearsay under a "residual" exception, but requires advance notice to the opponent. See
FED. R. Evm. 807. In an earlier work, I argued for an expansion of such a notice
requirement to cover broader categories of hearsay. See John G. Douglass, Balancing
Hearsay and Criminal Discovery, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2097, 2152-60 (2000)
[hereinafter Douglass, Balancing Hearsay].
5. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
6. In an earlier article, I explored the strategic choices spawned by the Court's
treatment of confrontation challenges to the hearsay statements of accomplices. See
John G. Douglass, Confronting the Reluctant Accomplice, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1797
(2001) [hereinafter Douglass, Confronting the Reluctant Accomplice].
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adversarial testing. And it may require prosecutors or courts to take
affirmative steps before trial, where those steps are necessary to provide
a defendant a fair opportunity to challenge hearsay admitted in evidence
at trial. Such steps might include notice and discovery regarding the
prosecution's hearsay evidence, ordering separate trials for
codefendants where one has uttered hearsay statements inculpating
another, depositions of hearsay declarants unable to testify at trial, and
even use immunity for hearsay declarants who are unavailable to testify
only because they invoke a Fifth Amendment privilege. 7
If courts recognize and enforce these affirmative confrontation
rights, then different strategic choices will emerge. Prosecutors must
respect those rights or risk exclusion of hearsay. And defendants must
assert those rights or risk waiving their objection to hearsay under the
Confrontation Clause. The constitutional debate over hearsay will shift
away from its current narrow focus on reliability and toward a broader
concern with the adversarial right to test prosecution evidence. In sum,
the confrontation debate will be about promoting confrontation, not
about avoiding it. ·
II. THE COURT'S APPROACH: THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AS A
RULE OF EVIDENCE

A. Confrontation and Hearsay: The Basic Dilemma

The Sixth Amendment states that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him ...." 8 When a prosecution witness testifies at trial, the
basic meaning of the confrontation right is simple enough. The witness
physically "confronts" the defendant when she testifies in the
defendant's presence. 9 Of course, "confrontation" means more than
7. I call such steps "affirmative rights," because they encompass more than the
"negative right" to exclude hearsay from evidence. Indeed, I suggest that a defendant's
affirmative right to challenge hearsay is separate from, and in addition to, any right he
may have to exclude hearsay under the rules of evidence or the Confrontation Clause.
But, as I argue later in this essay, the "negative" right to exclude evidence can give
courts the necessary leverage to require "affirmative" steps by the prosecutor. See infra
text at notes 88-90.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
9. While physical, face-to-face confrontation is an element of the confrontation
right in the typical case, the Court has found reasons to relax that requirement where
necessary to accommodate other interests. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836,
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passively watching while a prosecution witness launches her
accusations. The heart of confrontation is the right to challenge the
witness, to test her credibility and accuracy. Thus, the confrontation
right includes an "adequate opportunity" 10 to cross-examine witnesses
who testify against the accused.
But if the "witness against" the accused is a hearsay declarant who
never enters the courtroom, there is-literally-no "confrontation." 11
Even more important, there is no opportunity to cross-examine. Still, it
would be impractical to try most criminal cases without admitting some
hearsay. And there has never been a time in our history where
American courts barred all prosecution hearsay because it was not
subject to confrontation. 12 So confrontation and hearsay pose an
apparently insoluble dilemma. Hearsay seems incompatible with the
confrontation right. Yet-as a practical matter-criminal trials need
hearsay.
Unfortunately, neither the Sixth Amendment text nor its history
offers a clear answer to this dilemma. The text says nothing about
hearsay. 13 It does not even tell us whether the nontestifying hearsay

849-50 (1990) (permitting live, two-way closed circuit television testimony of child
witness found incapable of communicating in courtroom testimony).
10. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 73 (1980) (citing Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S.
204, 216 (1972)); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965); see also Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-18 (1974).
11. Of course, there are cases where the declarant testifies and is immediately
subject to cross-examination. In such cases, the Court has found no conflict between the
prosecution's use of hearsay and the defendant's confrontation right. Cross-examination
satisfies the right. See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988); Delaware v.
Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985); Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971); California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
12. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895) (noting that "from
time immemorial" dying declarations "have been treated as competent testimony."). For
an eighteenth-century history of the hearsay rules, see James W. Jennings, Preserving
the Right to Confrontation - A New Approach to Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Trials,
113 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 741, 746 (1965) ("[T]he established [hearsay] exceptions had gone
through a gradual and at times confusing development by the l 790's, and others were
still in the process of being refined."). See also JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 5 EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW§ 1364, at 12-28 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
13. The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

2003]

ADMISSIBILITY AS CAUSE AND EFFECT

1051

declarant is a "witness" at all. Of course, if the declarant is not a
"witness against" the accused, our hearsay dilemma disappears. The
Clause simply would not apply to hearsay. It would serve only to
prescribe an adversarial process for taking live evidence in a courtroom:
essentially the process of cross-examination. 14 But that approach would
open the door to easy abuse. Prosecutors could circumvent the basic
right of cross-examination by having witnesses testify in private
depositions, or through written affidavits, then bringing that collection
of hearsay to court as the government's case in chief while keeping
available witnesses at a distance. So the Clause must apply when the
government uses at least some forms of hearsay. 15
14. Wigmore reached this conclusion:
The net result, then, under the constitutional rule, is that, so far as testimony is
required under the hearsay rule to be taken infrajudicially, it shall be taken in a
certain way, namely, subject to cross-examination-not secretly or ex parte away
from the accused. The Constitution does not prescribe what kinds of testimonial
statements (dying declarations or the like) shall be given infrajudicially-this
depends on the law of evidence for the time being-but only what mode of
procedure shall be followed-i.e. a cross-examining procedure-in the case of
such testimony as is required by the ordinary law of evidence to be given
infrajudicially.
WIGMORE, supra note 12, §1397(3), at 159. Justice Harlan ultimately agreed. See
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 93-94 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("I have ... become
convinced that Wigmore states the correct view .... ").
15. One plausible reading of the Sixth Amendment text may be that some, but not
all, hearsay declarants are "witnesses against" the accused. If a declarant testifies in a
setting designed to create evidence for use at a criminal trial-as in a grand jury or an
affidavit prepared for the prosecutor-then he has become a "witness against" the
accused. If his out-of-court statement occurs in a different setting-as when a patient
tells his doctor about the assault that caused his wounds-then he may be a "witness" to
the assault, but he is not a "witness against" the accused when he makes his out-of-court
statement. At least two members of the Court have advanced this view. See White v.
Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Confrontation Clause is
implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained in formalized
testimonial material, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.");
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 864-65 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that
"witnesses against" the accused are only those witnesses to events who later give
testimony against an accused). Professors Amar and Friedman advocate a similar
approach. See Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles,
86 GEO. L.J. 1011, 1038-43 (1998); Akhil Reed Amar, Confrontation Clause First
Principles: A Reply to Professor Friedman, 86 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1045-49 (1998). Their
reading of the constitutional text offers some distinct advantages. It allows for the use
of a broad spectrum of admissible hearsay, as long as the government had no hand in
creating it. But it prohibits the government from orchestrating out-of-court testimony,
then using that testimony to circumvent the basic guaranty of cross-examination at trial.
Further, this reading comports with one of our basic notions about the purpose of the
Bill of Rights. The Framers sought to protect us against abuse by the government, not
against slings and arrows that might assail us from other quarters. See Margaret A.
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History sheds only a little light on the dilemma. 16 The history of
the Confrontation Clause, as Professor Friedman remarks, "[is]
famously obscure." 17 But even that obscure history suggests one safe
conclusion. At a minimum, the Clause was intended to prohibit trial by
ex parte affidavits or depositions where the accused had no opportunity
to see and question his accusers. 18 Thus, it seems safe to conclude that a
declarant who provides "testimony" in a government-orchestrated
proceeding-like a grand jury or deposition-is a "witness against" the
accused. Happily, then, the historical evidence comports with our
common-sense conclusion that the Clause cannot be circumvented by
allowing the government to generate hearsay as a substitute for live
testimony. Still, we are left with other important questions and no clear
historical answers. Does the Clause apply only to governmentAnd
sponsored, out-of-court statements, or does it go further?
regardless of what out-of-court statements it reaches, does the Clause
serve as a rule of evidence that excludes such statements? Or does it
operate as a rule of procedure that calls upon the government to
produce the declarant? 19 Finally, like so many constitutional provisions,
does the Clause allow for exceptions to its basic prohibitions? Can we
"balance" away some of its protections when they conflict with other
interests?
The Court's early confrontation-hearsay opinions offer few
Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a
Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, 561-62 (1992) (arguing that the
Confrontation Clause requires a heightened standard for admitting hearsay statements
elicited by government agents).
16. For useful accounts of the history of the Clause, see Berger, supra note 15, at
567-86; Graham C. Lilly, Notes on the Confrontation Clause and Ohio v. Roberts, 36 U.
FLA. L. REV. 207, 208-15 (1984).
17. Friedman, supra note 15, at 1022.
Justice Harlan wrote that "the
Confrontation Clause comes to us on faded parchment. History seems to give us very
little insight into the intended scope of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause."
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 173-74 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
18. In its first confrontation-hearsay opinion, the Court wrote, "The primary object
of [the Confrontation Clause] was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as
were sometimes admitted in civil cases, [from] being used against the prisoner in lieu of
a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness ...." Mattox v. United
States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895).
19. Writing for the Court in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), Justice
White argued that, "objections occasioned by this practice [of trial by affidavit] appear
primarily to have been aimed at the failure to call the witness to confront personally the
defendant at his trial. So far as appears, in claiming confrontation rights no objection
was made against receiving a witness' out-of-court depositions or statements, so long as
the witness was present at trial .... "). Id. at 157.
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answers. Those cases dealt almost exclusively with hearsay in the form
of testimony from prior judicial proceedings. In those circumstances,
the Court did not have to decide whether the Clause reached all hearsay,
or only some forms of government-created hearsay. It was easy enough
to assume-as the Court did-that a declarant who had testified in an
earlier judicial proceeding was a "witness against" the accused at trial
and that the Clause applied. The principal issue in those early cases was
simply the adequacy of a defendant's opportunity to cross-examine in
the earlier proceeding. 20 Then came Ohio v. Roberts. 21
B. Ohio v. Roberts: Reliability and "Firmly Rooted" Hearsay
Exceptions Become Surrogates for Confrontation
In Roberts, the trial court admitted into evidence a transcript of the
preliminary hearing testimony of a government witness who
disappeared before trial. Defense counsel cross-examined the witness at
the preliminary hearing. Consistent with its earlier opinions, therefore,
the Court might have decided Roberts' confrontation claims simply by
addressing the adequacy of his opportunity to cross-examine. But the
Court went further. It outlined a "general approach" to determine the
validity of all hearsay exceptions22 under the Confrontation Clause:
[A hearsay statement] is admissible only if it bears adequate "indicia of
reliability." Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence
falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must
be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of
23
trustworthiness.

The Roberts formula was derived through the familiar process of
abstracting from a rule, to its supposed purpose, to a new rule aimed to
satisfy the same purpose. And as often happens in such a quasi-logical
process, something important was lost at each step. The "underlying
purpose" of confrontation, the Court reasoned, is "to augment accuracy
in the factfinding process by ensuring the defendant an effective means
to test adverse evidence. " 24 Given that "accuracy" is its purpose, the
20. For an account of the "procedural rights" theme of those early cases, see
Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note 1, at 202-03.
21. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
22. Id. at 64-65 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970)).
23. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (quoting FED. R. Evm. 807).
24. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
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Court continued, "the Clause countenances only hearsay marked with
such trustworthiness that 'there is no material departure from the reason
of the general rule. "'25 Finally, the Court wrote, "certain hearsay
exceptions rest upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually
any evidence within them comports with the 'substance of the
constitutional protection. "'26 In other words, beginning with an
assumption that confrontation and hearsay were inherently
incompatible, the Court embarked upon a search for second-best
alternatives to the fundamental right to "test adverse evidence" through
cross-examination. "Indicia of reliability" became a surrogate for crossexamination. "Firmly rooted hearsay exceptions" substituted for any
real measure of reliability.
In only a few sentences, the Court had strayed considerably from
its initial observation that the Clause ensures "an effective means to test
adverse evidence." At the end of its sequence of substitutes, the Court
emerged with a rule that essentially equated the Confrontation Clause
with the hearsay rule and its many exceptions. Or at least its "firmly
rooted" exceptions.
C. "Firmly Rooted" Exceptions after Roberts-The "Lake

Wobegone "27 Theory of Reliability
Under Roberts, at least in theory, "firmly rooted" hearsay
exceptions encompass only those statements reliable enough to render
cross-examination an empty formalism. 28 It would make sense, then, to
apply Roberts' presumption of reliability to a limited list of hearsay
exceptions that define a class of statements of unquestioned
trustworthiness.
Further, given Roberts' reliance on the "solid
foundations" of "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions29-presumably a
reference to historical roots and foundations-it would make sense to
limit the presumption of reliability to hearsay that falls within the
25. Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934)).
26. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244
(1895)).
27. "In short, the Court's test for firmly rooted hearsay exceptions has been as
demanding as the 1.Q. tests administered to the fictional children of Lake Wobegon, and
the result has been the same: all turn out to be above average." See Douglass, Beyond
Admissibility, supra note 1, at 210 (citing Garrison Keiller, Monologue Excerpt, at
http//phc.mpr.org/activities/chats-1997/100197_children_hearts.html)
(last
visited
October 5, 1998).
28. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
29. Id. at 66.
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traditional core of those exceptions, rather than to forms of "fringe"
hearsay that have become admissible as traditional exceptions have
expanded in recent history. 30 But neither limit has emerged in the two
decades since Roberts.
To the contrary, the post-Roberts Court has welcomed most
hearsay exceptions with little scrutiny of their historical roots or their
real connection to reliability. The Court has presumed the reliability of
hearsay within the exceptions for coconspirator statements,3 1
spontaneous declarations, 32 and statements for purposes of medical
diagnosis. 33 More remarkable, the Court has accepted such hearsay as
"firmly rooted" even after the traditional boundaries of those exceptions
have been expanded to accommodate a broader range of less reliable
hearsay. 34 With no clear standard for assessing the reliability or
historical pedigree of particular hearsay exceptions, the lower courts
have been quick to follow the Court's lead, finding sufficiently firm
roots for most exceptions. 35
Virtually any statement admissible under the law of evidence now
satisfies the requirements of the Confrontation Clause, with one notable
exception. In the decades since Roberts, the Court has decided three
cases involving hearsay statements made by a defendant's accomplice
where the government argued that the evidence was admissible under
the hearsay exception for statements against interest. 36 Each time the
Court held the evidence inadmissible. Each time the Court expressed
30. For an account of the expanding world of admissible hearsay offered by
prosecutors, see Douglass, Balancing Hearsay, supra note 4, at 2106-32.
31. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987).
32. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355 n.8 (1992).
33. Id.
34. "[T]he Court has not applied its 'general approach' to fix hearsay exceptions
within their historical boundaries. Instead, the Court has bent the constitutional limits as
the hearsay exceptions themselves have expanded .... The hearsay 'tail' now wags the
constitutional 'dog."' Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note I, at 211.
35. See, e.g., Hatch v. Oklahoma, 58 F.3d 1447, 1467 (10th Cir. 1995) (recorded
recollection); United States v. Veltmann, 6 F.3d 1483, 1493-94 (I Ith Cir. 1993) (state of
mind exception); United States v. Saks, 964 F.2d 1514, 1525 (5th Cir. 1992) (admission
by agent); United States v. Picciandra, 788 F.2d 39, 42-43 (!st Cir. 1986) (recorded
recollection); Williams v. Melton, 733 F.2d 1492 (I I th Cir. 1984) (res gestae exception).
36. See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999) (holding that admission of
accomplice's blame-shifting hearsay statements violated Confrontation Clause);
Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 605 (1994) (holding hearsay inadmissible
under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3), while declining to reach the Confrontation Clause issue);
Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986) (holding that trial court violated the
Confrontation Clause by admitting the custodial confession of an accomplice
incriminating the defendant).
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concerns with the reliability of accomplice confessions that shift blame
to a defendant. But even after three tries, the Court has yet to say just
how accomplice confessions fit within the Roberts formula. 37
Ill. EFFECTS OF THE COURT'S APPROACH: AVOIDING CONFRONTATION
WHILE EXPANDING THE WORLD OF ADMISSIBLE HEARSAY

Rules of evidence affect the parties' strategic choices before and
outside of trial. The Roberts formula-which admits or excludes
hearsay based on its connection to a "firmly rooted" hearsay
exception-promotes choices that do little to serve the core purpose of
the Confrontation Clause: to allow adversarial testing of prosecution
evidence. And despite its purportedly strict test for reliability, the
Roberts approach does little to limit admissible hearsay. Indeed, it may
have encouraged strategies that have expanded some widely-used
exceptions to the hearsay rule.
A. Avoiding Confrontation while Debating Confrontation

By making reliability, and ultimately "firmly rooted hearsay
exceptions" the touchstone of admissibility, the Court has marginalized
the adversarial right to test hearsay evidence. Few admissibility
decisions tum upon the parties' efforts-or lack of efforts-to produce
available declarants or to take other steps that may allow for the fair
adversarial testing of hearsay. In making strategic choices, prosecutors
and defense counsel ignore real opportunities for confrontation because
they know that the admissibility of hearsay depends on something else:
its supposed reliability. As a result, both parties are free to debate
confrontation issues while ignoring available opportunities for real

37. In Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999), the last of the three, the Court
unanimously reversed a conviction based in part on an accomplice's blame-shifting
confession. But the Court failed to achieve consensus in applying the Roberts formula.
For a four-member plurality, Justice Stevens wrote that accomplice statements which
implicate a defendant are not within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. Instead, he
argued, such blame-shifting statements are presumptively unreliable. See Lilly, 527 U.S.
at 131 (plurality opinion). Concurring in the result along with two other Justices, Chief
Justice Rehnquist maintained that "genuinely self-inculpatory" statements fall within a
firmly rooted exception and qualify as reliable under the Confrontation Clause, even
though they may contain elements that inculpate an accused. Id. at 146 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring). Further, the Chief Justice argued, statements against interest may qualify
as "firmly rooted" where they are not made to the police under custodial interrogation.
Id.
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confrontation. 38
This phenomenon, avoiding confrontation while debating
confrontation, accurately describes the parties' strategic choices in many
post-Roberts cases raising confrontation-hearsay issues. The Court's
opinions offer a series of examples. The clearest may be United States
v. lnadi. 39 At trial, the government offered audio tapes containing
statements of a coconspirator, Lazaro. Defendant objected, arguing that
use of the hearsay statements deprived him of the right to confront
Lazaro. Following the Roberts approach, the trial court ultimately
resolved the issue by holding that coconspirator statements fell within a
"firmly rooted" exception that satisfied the Court's reliability standard. 40
Lost in the debate over reliability was Lazaro himself, who was alive,
subject to subpoena, and who had never asserted any claim of privilege.
At trial, defense counsel failed even to answer the court's simple
question, "Do you want him [Lazaro] to testify.'..i 1 For its part, the
government made only half-hearted efforts to bring Lazaro to court after
he claimed "car trouble.'..i 2 The irony of Lazaro's availability and his
absence did not escape notice in the Supreme Court. In affirming
Inadi 's conviction, the Court observed, "the actions of the parties in this
case demonstrate what is no doubt a frequent occurrence in conspiracy
cases-neither side wants a coconspirator as a witness." 43 In effect, the
prize at the heart of the debate - confrontation of the hearsay
declarant-was easily available to either party; yet neither party cared to
grasp it.
lnadi does not stand alone. In Dutton v. Evans, 44 the trial court
38. In an earlier article, I discussed the phenomenon of avoiding confrontation in
cases involving hearsay from accomplices:
In sum, by consistently ignoring confrontation in its constitutional analysis, the
Court has invited prosecutors and defendants to ignore confrontation as a tactical
choice. Since admissibility turns entirely on reliability, both parties can calculate
their Confrontation Clause strategies without regard for real opportunities to
confront the accomplice or to impeach his hearsay. As a result, confrontationhearsay arguments often become a game of Sixth Amendment "chicken," with
both parties pursuing an all-or-nothing battle over the reliability-and, hence, the
admissibility---0f hearsay, while neither is really anxious to see the accomplice on
the witness stand.
Douglass, Confronting the Reluctant Accomplice, supra note 6, at 1850.
39. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
40. Id. at 399-400.
41. Id. at 388-89.
42. Id. at 390.
43. lnadi, 475 U.S. at 397 n.7.
44. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
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admitted an accomplice's jailhouse confession implicating Dutton.
While vigorously pursuing a claim that admission of the hearsay denied
Dutton the right of confrontation, defense counsel candidly
acknowledged that he could have called the accomplice-declarant as a
witness but elected not to do so. 45 In White v. lllinois, 46 the trial court
admitted hearsay statements from a child declarant. The Court
entertained defendant's Confrontation Clause claims, even though the
defense made no effort to call the child as a witness. And the Court
allowed the hearsay, even though the trial court never found that the
prosecutor had exhausted efforts to make the child available to testify in
person. 47 Likewise in Lilly v. Virginia, 48 the Court's most recent
confrontation-hearsay opinion, both parties passed up opportunities to
confront the accomplice-declarant whose hearsay statements were the
focus of their debate. 49 In the final analysis, it did not matter that
confrontation may have been available if either party had wanted it.
The relevant debate, in the eyes of the Court, was all about reliability
and "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions.
This phenomenon of avoiding confrontation extends beyond cases
where the hearsay declarant may be literally, physically available for incourt confrontation.
The law of evidence offers a wealth of
opportunities for adversarial testing of hearsay even where the declarant
is unavailable. 50 In the debate over confrontation and hearsay, one

45. Id. at 88 n.19 ("Counsel for Evans informed us at oral argument that he could
have subpoenaed [the declarant] but had concluded that this course would not be in the
best interests of his client.").
46. 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
47. In White, the prosecutor at least tried to call the child as a witness, but
ultimately failed when the child suffered emotional breakdowns. Id. at 350. The
defense made no effort to call the witness. Id. And the trial court never made a finding
that the child was unavailable. Id. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that no finding
ofunavailability was required for admission of the hearsay. White, 502 U.S. at 354.
48. 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
49. See Douglass, Confronting the Reluctant Accomplice, supra note 6, at 1800 nn.
7, 8.
50. Federal Rule of Evidence 806 provides that an opponent of hearsay may attack
the credibility of the declarant "by any evidence which would be admissible for those
purposes if declarant had testified as a witness." Many states have comparable statutes.
See, e.g., JACK B. WEINSTEIN, ET AL., 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 806-14, 806-17 (1996);
cf UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 806 (1974) (virtually identical to Fed. R. Evid.
806). Experienced judges and trial advocates have extolled the virtues of Rule 806. See
Fred Warren Bennett, How to Administer the "Big Hurt" in a Criminal Case: The Life
and Times of Federal Rule of Evidence 806, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 1135, 1168 (1995)
(calling Rule 806 an "invaluable tool" for trial lawyers); Margaret Meriwether Cordray,
Evidence Rule 806 and the Problem of Impeaching the Nontestifying Declarant, 56
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might expect that such opportunities would become a natural focus.
After all, where live cross-examination may be impossible, shouldn't it
matter if an effective substitute is available for testing the credibility and
accuracy of the declarant? Shouldn't it matter if the defendant can
effectively impeach the declarant with prior inconsistent statements,
criminal convictions, bad acts, evidence of bias and other impeaching
material in much the same way he might impeach a live witness? But
after Roberts, in considering objections to hearsay, the Court has never
weighed the likely effectiveness of opportunities to impeach an absent
declarant. 51 And nothing in the Roberts formula gives defendants any
incentive to pursue such opportunities. 52
In sum, the Court has given us a confrontation-hearsay doctrine
that has little to do with confrontation. As a result, when making
strategic choices that frame confrontation-hearsay issues at trial, the
parties need not-and typically do not-make choices that lead to
confrontation.
B. Expanding the World ofAdmissible Hearsay

A natural effect of a rule excluding hearsay would be to encourage
would-be proponents of hearsay to seek other means to prove their
cases. In theory at least, hearsay exceptions that apply only where the
declarant is "unavailable" are designed with just such an effect in
Omo ST. L. J. 495 (1995); Hon. Anthony M. Brannon, Successful Shadowboxing: The
Art of Impeaching Hearsay Declarants, 13 CAMPBELL L. REV. 157, 158 (1991) (noting
trial lawyers' neglect of "golden opportunities" to impeach hearsay declarants). For a
detailed account of the art and efficacy of"virtual cross-examination, i.e., the practice of
impeaching an absent hearsay declarant, see Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note
1, at 251-60.
51. Twice the Court has considered a criminal defendant's right to impeach a
hearsay declarant, but both times the issue turned on interpretation of the law of
evidence. See Carver v. United States, 164 U.S. 694 (1897); Mattox v. United States,
156 U.S. 237, 244-50 (1895).
52. Of course, even without a constitutional incentive to pursue confrontation, we
might expect defendants who lose the battle over admissibility of hearsay to beat a
tactical retreat to the "second-best" choice of impeaching the hearsay declarant under
Rule 806 and similar provisions. But experience suggests that defendants typically
forego that opportunity. See Brannon, supra note 50, at 158. The reasons, I have
suggested elsewhere, may be tactical choices by defendants that (I) impeachment is
unnecessary because juries discount hearsay, or that (2) impeachment may diminish the
likely success of arguments to exclude hearsay and the likelihood of appellate reversal
from decisions admitting hearsay. In other words, defense counsel may "value the
confrontation issue more than the confrontation itself." Douglass, Beyond Admissibility,
supra note 1, at 222-23.

1060

QLR

[Vol. 21:1047

mind. 53 In Roberts itself, the Court initially applied the same theory in
its Confrontation Clause analysis. The government could rely on
hearsay only where the live version was unavailable. 54 But the Court
quickly recognized the practical difficulties of a rule requiring the
presence of the declarant in so many cases where the law of evidence
had never imposed such a limit. Only a few years after Roberts, the
Court retreated, admitting "firmly rooted," and, therefore, "reliable"
hearsay in most cases without regard to the availability of the
declarant. 55
By making "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions the test for
admissibility under the Confrontation Clause without regard to the
availability of the declarant, the Court encouraged a new kind of
strategic thinking by prosecutors.
Since the Court had linked
confrontation rights to the hearsay rules, prosecutors had an added
incentive to pursue strategies that might liberalize the hearsay rules
themselves. Not surprisingly then, Roberts quickly led prosecutors to
pigeonhole 56 more and more hearsay into "firmly rooted" exceptions
and thereby to avoid a separate constitutional inquiry. 57 Courts and
legislatures readily obliged such creativity by expanding the boundaries
of traditional exceptions in order to admit more hearsay. 58 Over the
53. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b), advisory committee's note ("The rule [requiring
unavailability as a condition for admitting hearsay] expresses preferences: testimony
given on the stand in person is preferred over hearsay, and hearsay, if of the specified
quality, is preferred over complete loss of the evidence of the declarant.").
Unfortunately, rules requiring unavailability can create a different kind of incentive
where one party retains some control over the availability of a witness, as a prosecutor
may do by granting or withholding use immunity. A prosecutor in possession of
favorable hearsay from a reluctant declarant may choose to withhold immunity, and
thereby keep the declarant "unavailable," in order to make the hearsay admissible. The
prosecutor "can satisfy the law of evidence only by avoiding confrontation." Douglass,
Confronting the Reluctant Accomplice, supra note 6, at 1851.
54. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).
55. The first step in that retreat came in United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387
(1986), where the Court ruled that coconspirator statements were admissible
notwithstanding the availability of the declarant. lnadi, 475 U.S. at 399-400. Six years
later, in White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992), the Court held that unavailability was a
Sixth Amendment prerequisite only for admission of prior testimony. White, 502 U.S.
at 354.
56. For a more extensive discussion of the "pigeonholing" of new hearsay into old
exceptions after Roberts, see Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note l, at 210-14.
57. The incentive exists because, under the Roberts analysis, firmly rooted
exceptions offer a safe harbor from Confrontation Clause challenges. See Roberts, 448
U.S. at 66. The convenience of Roberts is hard to resist. Two issues-hearsay and
confrontation-get turned into one.
58. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992), offers a good example. There, an

2003]

ADMISSIBILITY AS CAUSE AND EFFECT

1061

objections of Justice Blackmun, 59 the author of Roberts, the Court gave
at least its implicit blessing to that expansion, treating the newly
expanded categories of hearsay as "firmly rooted" nonetheless. 60
Suddenly, "firm roots" took on a distinctly modem look: new hearsay
had become old hearsay.
As a result, the Roberts approach-which seems designed to keep
prosecution hearsay within traditional limits - probably had the opposite
effect on the law of evidence. Instead of excluding hearsay at the
margins of traditional "firmly rooted" exceptions, courts expanded the
margins to embrace more hearsay. Post-Roberts decisions at all
levels-including several from the Supreme Court itself-simply put
old labels onto new forms of hearsay. And Roberts made those labels
matter more than ever before. The Roberts formula, originally designed
to admit hearsay with "solid foundations" of reliability, had made it
easier for hearsay of marginal reliability to pass constitutional muster.
IV. AN "EFFECTIVE MEANS TO TEST ADVERSE EVIDENCE": THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AS A RIGHT TO CONFRONT HEARSAY

The Roberts formula does not promote confrontation. It promotes
traditional hearsay labels as a talisman for reliable hearsay, and it
substitutes reliability for the adversarial right at the core of the

Illinois trial court had admitted a child's hearsay statements under the exceptions for
spontaneous declarations and for statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis.
White, 502 U.S. at 350. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed, but in doing so it
acknowledged that it had relaxed traditional limits on the admissibility of spontaneous
declarations, People v. White, 555 N.E.2d 1241, 1246-50 (Ill. App. 1990), and that it
had relied on a "new hearsay exception" enacted in 1988 to expand the "medical
diagnosis" exception beyond its historical boundaries, White, 555 N.E.2d at 1251.
59. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 186 (1987) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("[B]ecause the Court alters the traditional hearsay exemption ... I do not
believe that the Court can rely on the 'firmly rooted hearsay exception' rationale [of
Roberts], to avoid a determination whether any 'indicia of reliability' support the coconspirator's statement, as the Confrontation Clause surely demands.").
60. See id. Bourjaily challenged the admissibility of coconspirator statements
under Federal Rule of Evidence 80l(d}(2)(E), and further argued that their admission
violated the Confrontation Clause. In its ruling on the evidentiary issue, the Court
abandoned the traditional rule which had required trial courts to find independent
evidence of conspiracy before admitting a co-conspirator's statements. The Court found
that Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) eliminated the traditional restriction. Id. at 176-81.
Despite the fact that it had expanded the traditional exception only a few pages earlier in
order to accommodate the government's hearsay, the Court found that the statements
fell within the "firmly rooted" exception. Id. at 181-84. The Court gave similar
treatment to Illinois' newly expanded hearsay exceptions in White. See 502 U.S. at 357.
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Confrontation Clause. Because those substitutes are what matters in
today's confrontation-hearsay debates, the strategic choices of
prosecution and defense simply ignore confrontation and focus on
hearsay labels. The result is a confrontation doctrine that has little to do
with confrontation. In other words, confrontation-hearsay analysis is
consumed with the "negative" right to exclude unreliable hearsay. I
argue that it should focus instead on the "affirmative" right to
"confront" hearsay: the right to subject hearsay to adversarial testing
just as we test live testimony through cross-examination. 61
The "underlying purpose" of confrontation, according to Roberts,
is "to augment accuracy in the factfinding process by ensuring the
defendant an effective means to test adverse evidence."62 That starting
point is almost, but not quite, correct. Augmenting accuracy may be an
indirect result of the confrontation right; but it is not the right itself. 63
The Confrontation Clause does not guarantee reliable evidence. Even a
cross-examined witness may lie and his lies may escape detection.
Conversely, we allow-indeed we expect--defense counsel to crossexamine even the most reliable witnesses. Instead, as the Roberts Court
recognized before it began its hunt for surrogates, the right to confront
witnesses is the right to "an effective means to test adverse evidence."64
That is what the confrontation right means when a live witness testifies
for the prosecution. 65 And, I suggest, it means the same thing when the
"witness against" the defendant is a hearsay declarant. Where the law
of evidence allows prosecutors to use hearsay, the Confrontation Clause
grants defendants an opportunity to challenge it: that is, an opportunity
to impeach or contradict the declarant's "testimony" just like testimony
from any other witness.
This approach is easy enough to envision when the declarant is
available for live testimony. 66 Why should we treat the Confrontation
61. See Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note 1, at 224-40 (arguing that the
Confrontation Clause creates a right to "confront" hearsay, that is to subject otherwise
admissible hearsay to a process of adversarial testing).
62. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).
63. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 862 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("[T]he Confrontation Clause does not guarantee reliable evidence; it guarantees
specific trial procedures that were thought to assure reliable evidence ....").
64. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
65. See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-18 (1974); Brookhart v. Janis,
384 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1966).
66. In cases where the declarant actually testifies, the Court readily has reached
this conclusion. See United States v. Owen, 484 U.S. 554, 558-61 (1988); Delaware v.
Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 19-22 (1985); Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 628-29 (1971);
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Clause as a standard for "reliable" hearsay when confrontation isliterally-possible? If defendant wants confrontation, then let him have
confrontation. When the declarant is available, the simple answer to the
confrontation dilemma is to call the declarant as a witness if the
defendant wants to cross-examine. Members of the Court have skirted
this solution on a few occasions, but never fully embraced it. In Inadi,
the Court noted that calling the declarant would resolve the defendant's
concerns, but then-inaccurately, I suggest-assigned that right to the
Compulsory Process Clause. 67 Months before Inadi, Justice Harlan had
argued that history called for a similar approach: "[T]he Confrontation
Clause," he wrote, "reaches no farther than to require the prosecution to
produce any available witness whose declarations it seeks to use in a
criminal trial."68 He later backed away, believing it impractical to
require production of the declarant in many cases where hearsay had
been routinely admitted without calling the declarant. 69 In my view,
Justice Harlan's practical dilemma is less severe than he imagined. 70
And his basic idea is sound. Where the declarant is available and
hearsay is admitted, the Confrontation Clause allows a defendant to
demand confrontation, and to get it.
But what about cases where the declarant is truly unavailable:
where he is dead, unable or unwilling to testify, or far beyond the
court's subpoena power? The Court's confrontation-hearsay decisions
start with the assumption that "confrontation" is impossible in such

California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158-59 (1970).
67. United States v. lnadi, 475 U.S. 387, 397 (1986) ("If [defendant]
independently wanted to secure [the declarant's] testimony ... [t]he Compulsory
Process Clause would have aided [him] in obtaining the testimony."). Jnadi's reliance
on Compulsory Process, I contend, is misplaced. See Douglass, Beyond Admissibility,
supra note 1, at 244.
68. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
69. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95-96 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(arguing that producing the declarant would be "unduly inconvenient and of small
utility" in cases of, e.g., hearsay admitted as a business record).
70. The practical inconvenience of producing every available hearsay declarant for
all prosecution hearsay is greatly diminished if we require a defendant to assert his
confrontation right in the first instance, and then to exercise that right. As a practical
matter, that would resolve the issue in most cases. Few defendants are likely to care
about confrontation with, for example, a series of clerks who enter the data supporting
most admissible business records. Indeed, as lnadi and Dutton, and perhaps White and
Lilly, suggest, most defendants would prefer to avoid actual confrontation with most
declarants most of the time. And courts are well equipped to deal with frivolous
demands to produce witnesses whom the defense shows no real interest in crossexamining.
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cases. 71 So the Court turns to reliability as a surrogate for the real thing
that, it assumes, is beyond reach. In my view, we should not jump so
quickly to the conclusion that effective means of "confrontation" are
impossible just because the declarant is not physically available. And, if
we are to tum to a surrogate for physical confrontation, then we should
consider the next best alternative. We should treat the Confrontation
Clause as a right to any available means to subject even absent
declarants to a process of adversarial testing. If we did so, we would
have a doctrine that, as a practical matter, grants defendants more
effective tools for responding to hearsay than are currently available
under the Roberts formula for admitting "reliable" or "firmly rooted"
hearsay. And we would restructure strategic choices in a way that
promoted the core value of confrontation.
V. PROMOTING DIFFERENT STRATEGIC CHOICES: AFFIRMATIVE
CONFRONTATION RIGHTS OUTSIDE OF TRIAL

When presented with prosecution hearsay, courts following the
Roberts formula must ask, "Is it reliable?" or-even more narrowly"Is it within a firmly rooted exception?" I suggest that a better question
would be, "What steps have been taken, and what steps can we now
take, to allow for a fair adversarial challenge to this hearsay?" Courts
asking that question would not be engaged in a passive, microscopic
analysis of hearsay. They would challenge the defendant to exercise the
very confrontation rights he claimed to assert. And they would
challenge the prosecutor to respect those rights. The Confrontation
Clause would encompass "affirmative rights" to steps before and
outside of trial, where such steps were necessary to allow for the fair
adversarial testing of hearsay at trial.

71. Beginning with Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240-41 (1895), the
Court has always framed the confrontation-hearsay issue as a question of admissibility,
assuming that hearsay and confrontation were simply incompatible. See Douglass,
Beyond Admissibility, supra note 1, at 230. As a result, the Court's confrontationhearsay cases begin with the premise that some categories of hearsay must fall within
an "exception" to the basic rule requiring confrontation. See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243
(noting that the right of confrontation is "subject to exceptions, recognized long before
the adoption of the Constitution, and not interfering at all with its spirit.").
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A. The Case for Affirmative Confrontation Rights that Reach Beyond
the Trial

We often use the trial process in general, and the rules of
admissibility in particular, as a means for enforcing rights that govern
conduct outside of trial. The Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule is
a prime example, 72 as is the doctrine excluding confessions obtained in
violation of Miranda. 13 Conversely, in deciding whether the trial
process-including its rules of admissibility-is fair, we often consider
the impact of conduct and choices made outside of trial. Under Brady v.
Maryland, 74 for example, we reversed a conviction where the
prosecutor's pretrial decision not to disclose exculpatory evidence
caused us to lose confidence in the result at trial. 75
There are equally obvious cause-and-effect connections between
the basic Sixth Amendment right to a fair, adversarial trial on the one
hand, and a variety of pretrial events on the other. A number of the
Court's Sixth Amendment rulings pay heed to those connections. The
right to counsel, for example, attaches not just at the start of trial, but at
the moment defendant is formally charged with a crime. 76
It
encompasses the pretrial right to an adequate opportunity to prepare for
trial. 77 It calls for counsel's presence at critical pretrial proceedings that
may affect the right to effective cross-examination at trial. 78 At least
one of the Sixth Amendment's guarantees-the defendant's right to
"compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor" 79--<leals
explicitly with a process that begins before and outside of trial in order
to assure presentation of a defense at trial.
Indeed, the Sixth

72. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Of course, there remains the debate
whether the only right protected by the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is a right
that exists outside of trial. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 931-32 (1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
73. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
74. 373 U.S. 83, 87-89 (1963).
75. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985) (noting that exculpatory
evidence left undisclosed by a prosecutor is "material" where nondisclosure
"undermines confidence in the outcome.").
76. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (holding that right to counsel
attaches "at or after the [time that] adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated ...
whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or
arraignment.").
77. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
78. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
79. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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Amendment's opening phrase, "in all criminal prosecutions," 80 seems
calculated to reach conduct before and beyond the time and place of a
criminal trial.
In order to secure the right to effective confrontation at trial, courts
and parties may need to take steps before and outside of trial. Several of
the Court's early confrontation-hearsay opinions implicitly rely on that
cause-and-effect connection, excluding hearsay at trial not based on its
unreliability, but as a sanction where the government neglected pretrial
opportunities to bring about confrontation at trial. In Barber v. Page, 81
for example, the Court excluded hearsay under the Confrontation Clause
where the government made no effort to secure the attendance of a
declarant who was in prison. A century ago, in Motes v. United States, 82
the Court likewise excluded hearsay where declarant's absence at trial
was due to government negligence in releasing him from jail and failing
to monitor him.
In sum, the notion of an affirmative right to confront hearsay-a
right that would create pretrial obligations for prosecutors and exclude
evidence as a sanction for ignoring those obligations-is hardly
unprecedented. It is consistent with the Court's treatment of other Sixth
Amendment guarantees, and with the constitutional text. At least in
cases where declarants were subject to government control, and before
the modern Court's preoccupation with reliability, it was a right which
the Court readily recognized and enforced.
B. Defining Affirmative Rights under the Confrontation Clause
The project of defining limits for constitutional principles is
typically illuminated by reported cases where the litigants themselves
have struggled over such limits. But the right to confront hearsay offers
a different challenge. Because the Roberts reliability-based formula has
so thoroughly preempted the field of confrontation-hearsay litigation,
we are left largely to fend for ourselves. In the paragraphs that follow, I
do not pretend to exhaust this subject. 83 Instead, I will offer a few basic
80. See id. (emphasis added).
81. 390 U.S. 719, 723 (1968).
82-. 178 U.S. 458, 471 (1900).
83. For an application of the affirmative "right to confront hearsay" in the specific
case of accomplice-declarants, see Douglass, Confronting the Reluctant Accomplice,
supra note 6, at 1859-74. For a more general introduction to the concept of affirmative
confrontation rights outside of trial, see Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note 1, at
264-71.
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observations that, I hope, will contribute to a continuing discussion.
First, I suggest a simple starting point: at a minimum, the
prosecutor should do no harm. 84 Where the government elects to offer
hearsay, courts should scrutinize prosecutorial choices that may inhibit
confrontation. Choices that restrict a defendant's opportunity to test
hearsay should likewise diminish the government's opportunity to prove
its case through hearsay. In other words, the government should not
have its (hearsay) cake and eat it too. The problems of joinder and trial
order illustrate the point. In cases involving multiple defendants,
prosecutors enjoy considerable discretion in deciding whether to indict
and try defendants together or separately, and in what order to prosecute
separate cases.
But, as Lilly8 5 demonstrates, those choices can
determine whether one defendant-declarant is available to testify at the
trial of a codefendant, or whether a pending charge will leave the
declarant to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege while the government
offers his hearsay in evidence. 86 As a general rule, the Sixth
Amendment does not govern a prosecutor's charging decisions. But it
should prevent joinder or trial order calculations from becoming tools
for insuring the "unavailability" of accomplice declarants when the
government has accomplice hearsay at its disposal. 87
84. Motes illustrates this point. There, the government had effective control of an
incarcerated witness, but chose to release him and took no steps to monitor him. He
disappeared before trial and the prosecution offered his hearsay statements from earlier
testimony. The Court excluded the hearsay, at least in part because the government's
negligence had deprived defendant of an opportunity for confrontation. See Motes, 178
U.S. at 471.
85. See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
86. In lilly, defendant's brother, Mark Lilly, was called as a witness by the
prosecutor, but became "unavailable" to testify when he asserted his Fifth Amendment
privilege. The court then allowed the prosecutor to introduce a tape recorded hearsay
statement in which Mark implicated the defendant as triggerman in a murder. Lilly, 527
U.S. at 122. In retrospect at least, the prosecutor's strategy seems calculated to keep
Mark off the witness stand. Before Ben Lilly's trial, the prosecutor had entered a plea
bargain to obtain the cooperation and testimony of another accomplice-witness. But it
treated Mark Lilly differently, perhaps calculating that brotherly loyalty might diminish
Mark's value as a live witness. Shortly after Ben Lilly's trial, Mark pied guilty to first
degree murder and received a sentence of forty-nine years. See Brief for Petitioner at 7,
Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999). It seems likely that the prosecution chose to
delay Mark's trial or plea in order to deter him from taking the stand at Ben's trial,
changing his story and exonerating Ben. See id. (prosecution kept the "option of
charging Mark Lilly as the trigger man ifhe change[d] his story during his brother's trial
and trie[d] to take the blame.") (citing Lisa K. Garcia, Slaying Suspect 's Trial Starts
Today, THE ROANOKE TIMES, Oct. 15, 1996, at A2).
87. While the Court's decision in Lilly obviously limits the government's
opportunity to rely on blame-shifting hearsay from an accomplice, as the prosecution
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Second, hearsay should carry a price. The price should be
whatever is necessary to maintain a fair adversarial balance.
Prosecutors seeking to rely on hearsay should be required to take any
steps reasonably necessary to allow the defense an opportunity for
effective testing of that hearsay, even where such steps exceed a
prosecutor's typical obligations or intrude on otherwise discretionary
decisions. And exclusion of hearsay can be an appropriate means to
compel such steps. For example, the decision to grant use immunity to
a witness normally is within the prosecutor's discretion. Indeed, under
typical immunity statutes, courts have no power to grant use immunity
without a motion from the govemment. 88 But imagine the case, like
Lilly, where the prosecution offers hearsay from a declarant who is
unavailable to testify only because he asserts his Fifth Amendment
privilege. Now the balance of immunity-granting power has shifted.
The court can put the government to a choice: Grant use immunity to
the declarant, or forego the use of hearsay. 89 In many cases, that
immunity may be granted with no real risk to the government. And it
can restore the right of confrontation with the simple stroke of a pen. It
is, in short, a reasonable price for maintaining an adversarial process
where the government seeks to rely on hearsay.
Third, a defendant who asserts a confrontation right should attempt
to exercise that right. At first blush, this suggestion may seem to tum
the Sixth Amendment guarantee upside down. After all, the right "to be
confronted" with government witnesses seems to call for nothing in the
way of action from the defense. But even when a prosecution witness

had attempted to do in Lilly itself, the decision has not eliminated the problem. As postLil/y decisions in lower courts are beginning to demonstrate, a considerable variety of
accomplice hearsay is still admitted. See United States v. Papajohn, 212 F.3d 1112,
1118-20 (8th Cir. 2000) (admitting grand jury testimony of unavailable accomplice
based upon circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness); United States v. Boone, 229
F.3d 1231, 1233-34 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming conviction where trial court admitted
accomplice's statements against interest made to girlfriend); United States v. Shea, 211
F.3d 658, 669 (1st Cir. 2000) (admitting statements against interest made to friends).
88. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-03 (1994).
89. By requiring this choice, courts can allow both hearsay and confrontation.
Unfortunately, at least where the government relies on the hearsay exception for
statements against interest, the law of evidence stands in the way of this solution. When
she grants use immunity and thereby makes a declarant available to testify, a prosecutor
loses the chance to introduce hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), which
requires that the declarant be "unavailable." Current hearsay rules and confrontation
doctrine create a Catch-22. The prosecutor can satisfy the rules of evidence only by
avoiding confrontation. See Douglass, Confronting the Reluctant Accomplice, supra
note 6, at 1850-53.
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testifies in person at trial, the right of confrontation is not self-executing.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees an opportunity to cross-examine. 90
Still, defendant must seize that opportunity or he waives that right. 91 In
my view, we must apply a similar analysis in defining defendant's right
to confront hearsay. Otherwise, we are mired in the current system of
perverse incentives, where defendants can, and often do, assert the right
to confrontations they do not want. 92 If the declarant can be made
available, then any defendant who raises a Confrontation Clause
objection to hearsay must be prepared to answer "Yes" to the simple
question, "Do you want to cross-examine the declarant?" If the
declarant is unavailable, then defendant is entitled to use any reasonably
available means to impeach him in absentia. Of course, defendant is
entitled to make the tactical choice not to pursue such avenues for
impeachment. But in ruling on the fairness of admitting hearsay, courts
nevertheless should take into account any opportunity the defendant
chooses to eschew.
Fourth, information and preparation are the keys to effective
adversarial testing of evidence. The affirmative right to test prosecution
hearsay, therefore, must include rights to notice and discovery. 93
Effective cross-examination of a prosecution witness begins before trial
with the collection of "ammunition": the prior convictions, inconsistent
statements, evidence of disreputable acts and other information that will
give substance and direction to the cross-examiner's questions. 94
Indeed, most cross-examination has little to do with asking real
questions, and a lot to do with exposing that "ammunition" to the jury
through "questions" with already predictable answers. 95 Likewise, an
effective adversarial assault on the hearsay declarant may depend less
on the declarant's presence than on the information a defendant can
obtain about the declarant, and about his hearsay statements. At a
minimum, discovery rules that apply to prosecution witnesses must
90. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-18 (1974); Douglas v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 415, 418 (1965).
91. See, e.g., United States v. Figueroa, 976 F.2d 1446, 1457 (1st Cir. 1992);
United States v. Howard, 751 F.2d 336, 338 (10th Cir. 1984).
92. See supra text at notes 39-50.
93. See Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note l, at 264-69.
94. "[T]he right of cross-examination also may be significantly infringed by events
occurring outside the trial itself, such as the wholesale denial of access to material that
would serve as the basis for a significant line of inquiry at trial." Pennsylvania v.
Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 66 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
95. See STEVEN LUBET, MODERN TRIAL ADVOCACY 105 (2d ed. 1997); THOMAS A.
MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES 225 ( 1996).
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apply to hearsay declarants as well. 96 But a fair opportunity to
"confront" hearsay may require even more. Even more than the
testimony of a live witness, prosecution hearsay carries the potential for
surprise. A starting point for a fair adversarial response to hearsay,
then, must include reasonable notice that hearsay is coming. 97 And the
court's power to exclude hearsay creates the power to condition
admissibility on broader discovery. As a "price" for admitting hearsay
in the face of a Confrontation Clause objection, courts can and should
assure defendants adequate notice and the opportunity to assemble the
"ammunition" necessary to challenge it. 98 In addition, in the many
cases where a living, breathing hearsay declarant is available for some
kind of questioning outside of the trial itself, courts may condition the
admission of hearsay on a right to confront and question that declarant.
After all, real questioning of a declarant is a better substitute for in-court
confrontation than the Court's current substitute: a judicial
determination of reliability based on an assessment of the "firm roots"
of a given hearsay statement.
Fifth, and finally, some balancing of interests is inevitable in
96. For example, we should treat hearsay declarants as prosecution witnesses and
require the government to disclose any information material to their impeachment, just
as we do for live witnesses under Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).
Statutory disclosure obligations regarding government witnesses should apply equally to
hearsay declarants. See Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note 1, at 266-69
(arguing for the application of discovery principles under the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. §
3500, to hearsay declarants).
97. The Federal Rules of Evidence grant a right of notice to the opponent of
hearsay, but only in limited circumstances. See FED. R. Evm. 807 (requiring notice from
the proponent of"residual" hearsay). For a more extensive discussion of the importance
of notice in responding to prosecution hearsay, see Douglass, Balancing Hearsay, supra
note 4, at 2152-60.
98. Perhaps the most significant doctrinal impediment in applying the
Confrontation Clause to the process of pretrial discovery appears in the plurality opinion
of Justice Powell in Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 39. There, the Court affirmed the trial court's
refusal to allow discovery of a state agency's file regarding an investigation into child
abuse. Defendant sought the file in an effort to gather information that might prove
useful in cross-examining the state's principal witness. In rejecting defendant's claim,
Justice Powell wrote that the Confrontation Clause was not "a constitutionally
compelled rule of pretrial discovery." Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 52. "The right to
confrontation," he added, "is a trial right." Id. In response, Justice Blackmun's
concurring opinion states, "there might well be a confrontation violation if. . . a
defendant is denied pretrial access to information that would make possible effective
cross-examination of a crucial prosecution witness." Id. at 61-62 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). Years earlier, Justice Brennan likewise suggested that the Confrontation
Clause may be the appropriate source of discovery rights, where prior statements of
government witnesses are necessary for effective cross-examination. See Palermo v.
United States, 360 U.S. 343, 362-63 (1959) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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defining the extent of a right to test hearsay. As a practical matter, trials
require hearsay, and declarants cannot always be produced for live
cross-examination. Almost by definition, the hearsay-confrontation
dilemma presents a problem of "second-best" choices. 99 The dilemma
arises, in its most intractable form, when live cross-examination is
impossible. The Court has responded to that dilemma by prescribing a
balance based on reliability. But that balance requires us to drift too far
from the adversarial core of the confrontation right. The Court balances
the practical necessity for hearsay against the confrontation right by
asking: "Is the hearsay reliable enough to forego cross-examination?" I
suggest a slightly different question to govern the balance: "Does the
defendant have a fair opportunity to test the hearsay?" That is, after all,
the same kind of question that governs a defendant's right to crossexamine a live witness. Ultimately, it should serve as our guide in
defining the right to confront hearsay.
VI. CONCLUSION: FULL CIRCLE FOR CAUSE AND EFFECT

Viewing the Confrontation Clause as a right to test hearsay, rather
than as a right to exclude unreliable hearsay, creates a different set of
incentives for prosecution and defense. If defendant's right to a fair,
adversarial testing of hearsay encompasses affirmative rights outside of
trial, then the prosecutor ignores those rights at the risk of exclusion of
hearsay. And a defendant who eschews opportunities to exercise those
rights has little ground to complain that his confrontation rights have
been violated. Under this approach, courts do not look at hearsay under
the microscope of "reliability." They must consider how the evidence
got to trial in the form of hearsay: how opportunities to test the
information were created, ignored, or even destroyed along the way. By
doing that much, courts will promote-indeed they will demandstrategic choices outside of trial that foster confrontation at trial.

99. Hearsay rules often are described in terms of a "preference" for live testimony,
along with a willingness to tolerate the second-best alternative of hearsay as a matter of
necessity in limited cases. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 804(b) advisory committee's note;
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895).

